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Birch and Miss Minter that the indebtedness claimed did ac-
tually exist, and there is no evidence from which an inference 
can be drawn that such indebtedness was fictitious or that 
the representations made by defendant A. Otis Birch to plain-
tiff in relation thereto were false. 
Of course, if the evidence is insufficient to establish the 
fraud on the part of Mr. Birch, then Minter and Mrs. Birch 
necessarily are not liable. But assuming it is sufficient, there 
is a tot:>l lack of evidence to charge Minter and Mrs. Birch 
with Mr. Birch's fraudulent representations. It is conceded 
in the m:>jority opinion that neith~r l\Trs. Birch nor Minter 
made any reprCstmtations to plaintiff, fraudulent or other-
wise. In reg'urd to Mrs. Birch, there is no evidence that she 
had any knowleclfte that the indehtedness to Minter was fic-
titious or that any representations were made by her husband 
in connection therewith. The sole evidence in the record touch-
ing upon her connection with the transaction is that she knew 
nothing about Birch's business transactions; and that she was 
anxious to have the transaction settled. Surely, that is not 
sufficient to support a judgment against her. 
The basis stated in the majority opinion for holding Minter 
liable as a conspirator is that she must have known that the 
indebtedness between her and Birch was fictitious. She made 
no representations, had no knowledge of any being made, or 
of the settlement transaction between Birch and plaintiff. 
ThfJre is no showing of any plan, or scheme, or agrevment be-
tween Birch, Minter and Mrs. Birch to engage in a conspiracy 
to defraud plaintiff. It is essential to establish a conspiracy 
that a common plan and dosign for concerted action be proved. 
There is no evidence of such an agreement. 
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the judgment 
should be reversed. 
Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred. t·'·-·-··l~ -·n:' ........ I·-
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1942. Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a re-
hearing. 
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HELEN BERNHARD, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, v. 
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST & SAV-
INGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking Associa-
tion), Respondent. 
[1] 
JudiSmonts - Res Judicata - Action on Di1Iorent Claim or 
Cause.-The doctrine of res judicata, whereby any issue neces-
sarily decided in litigation by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion is conclusively dcterrilincd ns to the p:trtics or their 
privies if it is involv0d in !l subs011uent bw suit on a different 
cause of action, is based upon thu public policy of limiting 
litigation by preventing a party who h J had one fair trial 
on an issue from again drnwing' it into controversy, and serves 
to protect persons from blling twice VexlJd for tho sllme cause. 
rt must, however, conform to the mandate of due process of 
law. 
[2] rd.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-Par-
ties-Who Arc Partics-Privies.-Undor the requirement of 
privity, frequently announced as essential to the availllbility 
of a plea of res judicata, only parties to the former judg-
ment or their privies may tllk(J advantage of or be bound by 
it. A party in this connection is one who is "diroctly inter-
ested in the subject matter, nnd had a right to make defense, 
or to control the proceedings, and to appeal from the judg-
ment." A privy is one who, Ilfter rendition of the judgment, 
has acquired an intorest in the subject ma:ter affected by 
the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by in-
heritance, succession, or purchase. 
[3] rd. - Res Judicata - Action on Different Claim O~\ Cause _ 
Mutuality of Estoppel.-If muturJity of estoppel is requisite 
to authorize relillnce on a plea of res judicata, the estoppel is 
mutual if the one taking advantllge of the earlier adjudica-
tion would have been bound by it, had it gone against him. 
[4] n.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-Par_ 
ties-Criteria.-The criteria for determining who m~y assert 
[1] See 15 Cal. Jur. 97; 30 Am. Jur. 908. 
[3] See 15 Cal. Jur. 190; 30 Am. Jur. 954. 
Mcrr. r·J. References: [1, 5J Judgments, § 367; [2] Judgments, 
§§ 415, 422, 429; [3J Judgments, § 369; [4] Judgments, § 415; 
[6J Judgments, § 435. 
--
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a .lIe", of res judicata differ fundamentally from the criteria 
fo- determining against whom a plea may be asserted. While 
the requirements of due process of law forbid the assertion 
of such a plea against a party unless he was bound by the 
earlier litigation in which the matter was decideJ, there is 
no compelling reason for requiring that the party asserting 
the plea must have been a party, or in privy with a party, to 
the earlier litigation. 
[5] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Oause or CIaim.-In 
a determination of the validity of a plea of res judicata three 
questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in 
question' Was there a final judgment on the merits' Was 
the party against whom the plea is asserteu a party or in 
privy with a party to the prior adjudication? (Estate of 
Smead, 219 Cal. 972 [28 Pac. (2d) 348]; Silva v. Hawkins, 
152 Cal. 138 [92 Pac. 72J and People v. Rodgers, 118 Cal. 
393 [43 Pac. 740, 50 Pac. 6eS], overruled in part.) 
[6] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-Par-
ties-Decedents, Personal Representatives.-In an action by 
an administratrix against a bank for the amount of a bank 
deposit, the bank is not precluded by the lack of privity or 
mutuality of estoppel from urging as a former adjudication 
the probate court's determination, when settling the account 
of a former executor, that the decedent had made a gift to 
him of the amount of the deposit where the plaintiff and 
other ' ~gatees in the probate proceeding interposed, objec<,ions 
to the account, and where the plaintiff, although suing in a 
different capacity, is seeking a recovery for the benefit of 
legatees and creditors, all of whom are bound by the order. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Myron Westover, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by administratrix to recover a bank deposit. Judg-
ment for defendant affirmed. 
Joseph Brenner for Appellant. 
Louis Ferrari, Edmund Nelson and G. L. Berrey for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In June, 1933, Mrs. Clara Sather, all 
elderly woman, made her home with Mr. and Mrs. Charles 
[6] See 12 Cal. Jur. 62; 15 Cal. Jur.117, 120, 189. 
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O. Cook in San Dimas, California. Because of her failing 
health, she authorized Mr. Cook and Dr. Joseph Zeiler to make 
drafts jointly ngainst her commercial account in the Src;lrity 
First National Bank of Los Angeles. On August 24:, In3, 
Mr. Cook opened a commercial account at the First National 
Bnnk of San Dimas in the name of "Clara Sather by CLurlc.:s 
O. Cook." No authorization for this account was ever given 
to the br.nkby Mrs. Sathor. Thereafter, 11 number of checks 
dra'wn by Cook and Zeiler on Mrs. Sather's commercial :te-
count in Los Angeles were deposited in the San Dimas :te-
cuunt alld checks were drawn upon that account ::iglled 
"C1:1r:1 Sather by Charles O. Cook" to meet variol!.'3 ex-
pllnsesof Mrs. Sather. 
011 October 26, 1933, a teller from the Los Angeles B:mk 
caU(od on 1111'S. Sather at her request to assist in transferrh:g 
hermonoy from thc Los Angeles Bank to the San Dim'ts Bank. 
In the presence of this teller, the cashier of the S:m Dimas 
Bank, 1Ifr. Cook, and her physician, Mrs. S:tther signed by 
m:trk an authorization directing the Security First Natiol1al 
n.']!!k of Los Angeles to transfer the balance of her saving'S 
account in the amount of $4,155.68 to the First National BImk 
of S'ln Dimas. She also signed an order for this amonnt on 
the Security First National Bank of San Dimas "for credit 
to the account of Mrs. Clara Sather. " The order was credited 
hy the San Dimas Bank to the account of "Clara Sather by 
Charleil O. Cook." Cook withdrew the entire balance from 
that nccount:md opened a new account in the same bank in 
the name of himself and his wife. He subsequently withdrew 
the .funds from this last mentioned account an4 deposited 
them in a Los Angeles Bank in the names of himself and his 
wife. 
Mrs. Sather died in November, 1933. Cook qualified as 
executor of the estate and proceeded with its administration. 
After a lapse of several years he filed an account at the in-
stance of the probate court accompanied by his resienation. 
The account made no mention of the money transferred by 
Mrs. Sather to the San Dimas Bank; and Helen Bernhard, 
Beaulah Bernhard, Hester Burton, and Iva LeDoux, benefi-
ciaries under Mrs. Sather's will, filed objections to the ac-
count for this reason. After a hearing on the objections the 
court settled the account, and as part of its order declared that 
810 BERNItARD v. BANK OF AMERlCA. [19 C. (2d) 
the decedent during her lifetime had made a gift to Charles 
O. Cook of the amount of the deposit in question. 
After Cook's discharge, Helen Bernhard was appointed ad-
ministratrix with the will annexed. She instituted this action 
ag-ainst defrndant, the Bank of America, successor to the San 
Dimas Bank, seeking to recover the deposit on the gro~md 
that the hank was indebted to the estate for this amount be-
cause !lIrs. Sather never authorized its withdrawal. In addi-
tion to a general denial, defendant plraded two affirm:tth'e 
dcf211ses: (1) that the money on deposit was paid out to 
Charles O. Cook with the consent of Mrs. SathC>f and (2) that 
this fact is res judicata by virtu{' of the finding of the probate 
court in the proceeding to settle Cook's account that lHrs. 
Sather made a gift of the money in question to Charles O. 
Cook and "owned no sums of mone:}' what.soevrr" at the time 
of her death. Plaintiff demurred to both th(,se defenses, and 
objec·ted to the introduction in evidence of the record uf~the 
earlier proceeding to support the plc>a of reS judiC':lta. She 
also contended that the probate court had no juris,lictiun to 
pass UPO:l'. Cook's ownership of the money because the E'xecu-
tor reskned before the filing' of the objections. This last wn-
tedion was answered before juilp.:ment was entered, by ihe 
dcllision of this court in tv llterland v. Superior Court, 15 Cnl. 
(2d) 34 [98 Pac. (2d) 211], holding that the probate court has 
jurisdiction in such a situation. The trial court overruled the 
demurrers and objection to the evidence, and gave judgment 
for defendant on the ground that Cook's ownership of the 
money was conclusively established by the finding of the pro-
bate court. Plaintiff has appealed, denying that the doctrine 
of res jUdicata is applicable to the instant case or that there 
was a valid gift of the money to Cook by Mrs. Sather. 
Plaintiff contends that the doctrine of res jUdicata does not 
apply because the defendant who is asserting the plea WtlS 
not a party to the previous action nor in privity with a party 
to that action and because there is no mutuality of estoppel. 
[1] The doctrine of res jUdicata precludes parties or their 
privies from relitigating a cause of action that hits b,~en 
finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Any 
issue necessarily decided in such litigation is conclusively de-
termined as to the parties or their privies if it is involved in 
a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of action. (See cases 
cited in 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.) sec. 627 i 2 Black, 
Mar. 1942.J BIi:RNHARD v. BANK OF AMERICA. 
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Judgments (2d ed.), sec. 504; 34 C. J. 742 et seq.; 15 Cal. 
Jur. 97.) The rule is based upon the sound public policy of 
limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had. one 
fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controyersy. 
(See cases cited in 38 Yale L. J. 299; 2 Freeman, Judgments 
(5th ed.), sec. 626; 15 Cal. J ur. 98.) The doctrine also serves 
to protect persons from being twice vexed for the same cause. 
(lMd.) It must, however, conform to the mandate of due 
process ,)f law that no person be deprived of personal or prop-
erty ri7bts by a judgment without notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. (Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 36 Del. 124 
[172 Atl. 260]. See eases cited in 24 Am. and Eng. Encyc. 
(2d ed.), 731; 15 Cinn. L. Rev. 349, 351; 82 Pa. L. Rev. 
871, 872.) 
[2] Many courts have stated the facile formula that the 
plea ,·f res judicata is availa~)le only when there is privity 
and mutuality of estoppel. (See cases cited in2 Black, Judg-
mf'nts (2tl. ed.), secs. 534, 548, 549; 1 Freeman, Judgments 
(5th ed.), sres. 407, 428; 35 Yale L. J. 607, 608; 34 C. J. 
973, m:l8.) Under the requinment of privity, only parties 
to the former judgment or their privies may take advantage 
of or be bound by it. (Ibid.) A party in this connection is 
one who is "directly interested in the subject matter, and 
had a right to make defense, or to control the proceeding, 
and to appeal from the judgment." (1 Greenleaf, Evidence 
(15th cd.), sec. 523. See cases cited in 2 Black, Judg'ments 
(2d ed.), sec. 534; 15 R. C. L. 1009*; 9 Va. L. Reg. (Ni.S.) 241, 
242; 15 Cal. Jur. 190; 34 C. J. 992.) A privy is one who, 
after rendition of the judgment, has acquired an interest in 
the suhject matter affected by the judgment through or under 
one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase. 
(See cases cited in 2 Black, Judgments (2d ed.), see. 549; 
35 Yale L. J. 607, 608; 34 C. J. 973, 1010, 1012; 15 R. C. L. 
1016.*) [3] The estoppel is mutual if the one taking advan-
tage of the earlier adjudication would have been bound by it, 
had it gone against him. (See cases cited in 2 Black, Judgments 
(2d ed.), sec. 534, 548; 1 Freeman, JUdgments (5th ed.), sec. 
428; 35 Yale L. J. 607, 608; 34 C. J. 988; 15 R. C. L. 956.*) 
[4] The criteria for determining who may assert a plea 
of res jUdicata differ fundamentally from the criteria for 
*30 Am. Jur. Judgments §§ 219-246. 
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determining against whom a plea of res judicata may be 
asserted. The requirements of due process of law forbid the 
assertion of a plea of res judicata against a party unless 
he was bound by the earlier litigation in which the matter 
was decided. (Coca Cola (Jo. v. Pepsi Cola Co" supra,. See 
,cases cited in 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc. (2ded) 731; 15 Cinn. 
L. Rev. 349, 351; 82 Pa. L. Rev. 871, 872.) He is bound by 
that litigation only if he has been a party thereto or in privity 
with a party thereto. (Ibid.) There is no compellillgreason, 
however, for requiring that the party asserting the plea of 
res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a 
party, to the earlier litigation. 
No satisf:tCtory rationalization has been advanced for the 
rcquirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not 
bound by a previous action should be precluded trom assert-
ing it as res judicata 'against a party Who was bound by it is 
difficult to comprehl'nd. (See 7 Bentham's Works (Bow-
ring's ed.) 171.) Many courtsMvc abandoned the require-
meut of mutuality and confined the requirement of privity 
to the party against whom the plea of res judicata is 
asserted. (Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., supraj Liberty 
Mutua~ Insur. Co. v. George Colon & Cd., 260 N. Y. 305 [183 
N. E. 506] ; Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396; Eagle etc. Insur. 
Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82 [140 S. E. 314, 57 .t\.. L. R. 490] ; 
Jenkins v. AtllmticCoast Line R. Co., 89 S. C. 408 [71 S. E. 
1010] ; United States v. Wexler, SFcd. (2d) 880. See Good 
Health Dairy Food Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14 
[9 N. E. (2d) 758, 112 A. L. R. 401].) The commentators 
are almost unanimously in accord. (35 Yale L. J. 607; 9 Va. 
L,. Reg'. (N. S.) 241 j 29 TIL L. Rev. 93 j 18 N; Y. U. L. Q.R. 
565, 570 ;12 Corn. L. Q. 92.) The courts of most jurisdic-
tions hll.ve in effect accomplished the same result by recog-
nizing a broad exception to the requirements of mutuality 
and privity, namely, that they a:re not necessary where the 
liability of the defendant asserting the plea of res judicata 
is dependent upon or derived' from the liability of one who 
was exonerated in an earlier ::mit brought by the same plain-
tiff upon the same facts. (See 'cases cited i.n 35 Yale L; J. 
607, 610; 9 Va. L. Reg. (N. S.) 241, 245~247; 29 Ill. L. Rev. 
93, 94 j 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 565,566-567; 34 C. J. 988-989.) 
Typical examples of such derivative liability are master and 
servant, principal and agent, and indemnitor and indemnitee. 
Thus, if a plaintiff sues a servant for injuries caused by the 
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servant's alleged negligeuce within the scope of his employ-
ment, a judgment against the plaintiff on the grounds that 
the servant Was not negligent can be pleaded by the master 
as res jlldicata if he is subseqnently sued by the same plain-
tiff for the Sll.me injuries. Conversely, if the plaintiff first 
sues the master, a judgment against the plnintiff on the 
grounds that the servant was not negligent Clln be pleaded 
, by the servant as res judicata if he is subsequently sued by 
'the plaintiff. In each of these situations the party asserting 
the plea of res judIcata was not a party to the previous action 
nor in privity with such a party under the accepted definition 
of a privy setforth above. Likewise, the estoppel is not mutual 
since the party asserting the plea, not having been a party or 
in privity with a party to the former action, would not have 
been bound by it had it been decided the other way. The 
cases justify this exception on the ground that it would be 
unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen 
ideuticalissues by merely switching adversaries. 
[5] b determinin,g the validity ofa plea of res judicata 
three questions are pertinent : Was the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the 
action ill question? Was there a final judgment on the mcrits? 
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or 
I in privity with n party to the prior adjudication' Estate of 
Smead, 210 Cal. 572 [28 Pac. (2d) 348J; S~"lva IV. Hawkins, 
152 Cal. 138 [92 Pac. 72], and People v. Rodgers, 118 Cal. 
393 [46 Pac. 740, 50 Pac. 668], to the extent that they are 
inconsistent with this opinion, are overruled. 
[6] In the present case, therefore, the defendant is not 
precluded by lack of privity Or of mutuality of estoppel from 
assertinr, the plea of res judicata against the plaintiff. Since 
the issue as to the ownership of the moneyis identical with 
the issue raised in the probate proceeding, and sinee the order 
of the probate eQurt settling the executor's account, was , a 
final adjudication of this issue on the merits (Prob. Code, 
sec. 931 [formerly Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1637]; see cases 
cited i1112 Cal. JUl'. 62, 63; 15 Cal. JUl'. 117, 120), it remains 
, only to determine whether the plaintiff in the present action 
was a party or in privity with a party to the earlier proceed-
in~. The plaintiff has bro~ght the present action in the capa-
city of administratrix of the estate. In this capacity she rep-
resents the very same persons and interests that were repre-
sented ill the earlier hearing on the executor ~s account. In 
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that proceeding plaintiff and the other legatees who objected 
to the executor's account represented the estate of the dece-
dent. They were seeking not a personal recovery but, like the 
plaintiff in the present action, as administratrix, a recovery 
for the benefit of the legatees and creditors of the estate, all 
of whom were bound by the order settling the account. 
(Prob. Code, sec. 931. See cases cited in 12 Cal. JUl'. 62, 63.) 
The plea of res judicata is therefore available against plain-
tiff as a party to the former proceeding, despite her formal 
change of capacity. "Where a party though appcarin{; in 
two suits in different capacities is in fact litigating the sar.Ie 
right, the judgment in one estops him in the other." (15 
Cal. Jur. 189; Williams v. Southern Pacific 00., 54 Cal. ~\.pp. 
571 [202 Pac. 3561; Stevens v. Superior 001trt, 155 Cal. 148 
[99 Pac. 512] ; Estate of Bell, 153 Cal. 331 [95 Pac. 3721· 
See Ohicago, R. <17 I. R. R. 00. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611 [46 
S. Ct. 420, 70 L. Ed. 7571 ; Sunshine A. Coal 00. v. Adkins, 
310 U. S. 381, 401 et seq. [60 S. Ct. 907, 84 L. Ed. 12631 ; 
Lee 00. v. Federal Trade Oom., 113 Fed. (2d) 583; and cases 
cited in 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 158,159; 38 Yale L. J. 2~9, 310; 
54 Harv. L. Rev. 890.) 
The judgment is affirmea 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., 
and Carter,' J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1942. 
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CONSOLIDATED MILK PRODUCERS FOR SAN FRAN-
CISCO (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. WILLIAM B. 
PARKER, as Director of Agriculture, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Food-Milk-Milk Control Act-Sales on Federal Territory.-
The Director of Agriculture has no jurisdiction to establish 
minimum prices for milk sold on territory over which the 
United States has exclusive jurisdiction, the invitation for 
bids being issued within, and the bids being filed and accepted 
in such territory. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Director of 
Agriculture to take proper proceedings against milk dis-
tributors which contracted to sell milk below established min-
imum prices. Writ denied. 
Bartley C. Crum and Philip S. Ehrlich for Petitioner. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and W. R. Augustine, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
Frank J. Hennessy, United States Attorney,ahd William 
E. Licking, Assistant United States Attorney, as Amici 
C1lriae, on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Three distributors of fluid milk licensed 
to do business in the San Fl,'ancisco marketing area have con-
tracted to sell fluid milk, at prices below those set by the 
Director of Agriculture, to military agencies of the United 
States in the Presidio. The Consolidated Milk Producers, an 
association of milk producers for the San Francisco area, 
requested the Director of Agriculture to take action to pre-
vent. these sales. They also filed a verified complaint with the 
director alleging that the sales violated the stabilization and 
marketing plan for San Francisco and requested that a hear-
'ing be held to determine whether the licenses of the offending 
distributors should be revoked. The director refused to take 
action on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to fix the 
[lJ· See 23 Cal. Jur. 527. 
Melt. Dig. Reference: [1] Food, § 1. 
